Abstract. A non-Archimedean utility representation theorem for independendent and transitive preference orderings that are partially continuous on some convex subset and satisfy an axiom of incommensurable preference for elements outside that subset is proven. For complete preference orderings, the theorem is deduced directly from the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem; in the absence of completeness, Aumann's (1962) generalization is utilized.
Introduction
Non-Archimedean utility representations are representations of preference orderings by means of utility functions whose range is a lexicographically ordered vector space or a non-Archimedean real-ordered field (e.g. an ultrapower of the reals with respect to a non-principal ultrafilter). Such representations have been studied in remarkable generality, through the theory of mixture spaces, for half a century. Initiated by Hausner [4] and Thrall [11] , the field has seen notable contributions by Fishburn [2] , Skala [9, 10] , Fishburn and Lavalle [3] , Kannai [6] , and, more recently, Lehmann [7] , to mention but a few.
It seems that no attempt has been undertaken so far to arrive at nonArchimedean utility functions in a more direct manner, viz. by invoking the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem [12] -or, in the absence of completeness, Aumann's generalization 1 [1] -for the convex subspace of finite-utility lotteries and introducing an incommensurability axiom for infinite values. 2 The present short note fills this gap.
Main result
Consider a subset B of a real vector space, and let X be its convex hull. Suppose is a binary relation ⊆ X × X. For any x, y ∈ X, we shall write x ≺ y whenever x y but y x, and x ∼ y whenever both x y and y x.
Let n ∈ N and suppose that there are x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B such that x k ≺ x k+1 for all k < n. For every k ≤ n, we define
and denote the convex hull of B k by X k . For any x ∈ X and X ⊆ X, we say that x is incommensurably preferable to X if and only if
Let V be the real vector space R n+1 , and let < be the strict lexicographical linear ordering of V . The unit vectors of the canonical basis of V are denoted e 0 , . . . , e n .
A utility representation function for is an affine map U : X → V such that for all x, y ∈ X,
• if x ≺ y then U (x) < U (y), and
Theorem 1. Suppose satisfies all of the following axioms:
• Reflexivity. For all x ∈ X, x x.
• Transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X, if x y and y z, then x z.
• Independence. For all x, y, z ∈ X and p ∈ (0, 1],
• Partial Continuity. 3 For all x, y, z ∈ X 0 with y ≺ z, there exists some p ∈ (0, 1) such that
• Incommensurability of Infinite Values. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the outcome x k is incommensurably preferable to B k−1 . Then there exists a utility representation function for .
The proof uses Aumann's generalization of the von NeumannMorgenstern theorem for a partial ordering on a mixture spaces, in the formulation of Aumann [1] . A closely related result, which can be proven The referee suggested the use of Aumann's result [1] in order to remove the assumption of completeness. The original submission did not contain Theorem 1.
2
From a historical vantage point, this is rather surprising, since von Neumann and Morgenstern [12] themselves recognized the possibility of non-Archimedean utility functions (cf. Skala [10] for a discussion of this point). As the referee pointed out, von Neumann and Morgenstern actually anticipated that in the absence of the completeness axiom, one obtains "a many-dimensional concept of utility" [12, 3.7.2] .
3 This formulation of continuity on X0 either directly from the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem or as a corollary of Theorem 1, is the following:
There exists some affine function U :
if and only if satisfies all of the following axioms:
• Completeness. For all x, y ∈ X, either x y or y x or both.
• Partial Continuity. For all x, y, z ∈ X 0 with x ≺ y ≺ z, there exist p, q ∈ (0, 1) such that
• Incommensurability of Infinite Values. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the outcome x k is incommensurably preferable to B k−1 .
We have chosen the framework of mixture spaces in this paper because this seems to be the most popular setting for applications of nonArchimedean utility theory in fields such as philosophical decision theory. As an alternative approach, one could assume that X is itself a real vector space, rather than merely a convex subset thereof. In this framework, it would be more natural to employ the theory developed by Kannai [5] , which also extends to infinite dimensions, rather than Aumann's findings [1] . Choosing this route would, in particular, lead to new versions of Theorems 1 and 2 where X may be chosen as V = R n+1 and even the identity map on V could be an admissible choice of U .
As a corollary to Theorem 2, we also obtain a utility representation of in a non-Archimedean field whenever satisfies the axioms listed in Theorem 2. In the following, * R is the non-Archimedean field of hyperreals (in the sense of Robinsonian nonstandard analysis [8] ), 4 and I denotes an arbitrary, but fixed positive infinite hyperreal (i.e. I > n for all n ∈ N). Corollary 3. There exists some affine function u :
if and only if satisfies the axioms of completeness, transitivity, independence, partial continuity, and incommensurability of infinite values.
The interpretation of the incommensurability of infinite values is straightforward: For every level k ≤ n, the slightest positive chance of winning the lottery with pure outcome x k is still preferable to any lottery with pure outcome from B k−1 -and, in fact, to any lottery from X k−1 (see Lemma 5) .
This means first of all that x 1 , . . . , x n are incommensurably preferable to X 0 . But on X 0 , the relation has a real-valued (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility representation X 0 (by its continuity on X 0 ). Therefore, x 1 , . . . , x n must be infinite-utility outcomes. In addition, the incommensurability of infinite values asserts that there is a strict hierarchy of incommensurable preference among these outcomes.
For examples and applications, we refer to Thrall [11] and only mention that military strategic choices often involve such decisions: Nearly everything should be risked for winning a war, and all supplies should be risked for conserving manpower.
Possible applications might also include economic reasoning in law when legal norms of varying importance are at stake.
From a historical perspective, the prime example would be Pascal's wager: Pascal's wagerer has to choose between searching after the Christian God, which with positive probability leads to salvation and hence infinite utility (in case the Christian God exists and the wagerer ends up wagering for Him) or faith in atheism.
Proof
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 utilize the following Lemma:
Suppose is transitive and independent, and let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If x k is incommensurably preferable to B k−1 , then
The proof of Lemma 4, in turn, requires another result:
Lemma 5. Suppose is transitive and independent, and let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If x k is incommensurably preferable to B k−1 , then also to X k−1 .
In the proof of the Lemmas and the Theorem, we will use that ∀x, y, z ∈ X ∀p ∈ (0, 1]
(which is a consequence of 's independence in general and even equivalent to independence for complete ).
Proof of Lemma 5. Define
First we shall prove that B k−1 ⊆ Z k−1 . Consider any z ∈ B k−1 . Let q ∈ (0, 1], and define
Note that Y is convex: For every y, y ∈ Y and p ∈ (0, 1), independence yields
hence by transitivity, py
On the other hand, B k−1 ⊆ Y by assumption, so X k−1 , the convex hull of B k−1 , must also be ⊆ Y . Therefore, y ≺ qx k + (1 − q) z for all y ∈ X k−1 . Since q ∈ (0, 1] was arbitrary, we even get that
whence already z ∈ Z k−1 . Therefore B k−1 ⊆ Z k−1 , as claimed.
Next we prove that Z k−1 is convex. Consider any w, z ∈ Z k−1 and p ∈ (0, 1). We shall prove that pw + (1 − p)z ∈ Z k−1 . For all y ∈ X k−1 and q ∈ (0, 1], independence gives us
By transitivity, we obtain
, as was shown in the first part of this proof. Therefore, the set X k−1 , the convex hull of B k−1 , must also be
Proof of Lemma 4. Let y, z ∈ X k−1 and p < q ∈ [0, 1]. We need to prove that In particular, the formula in Lemma 4 is valid for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} if satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that satisfies the axioms listed in the Theorem. Recursively in k, we shall construct an affine function U k :
U 0 is chosen as Aumann's utility representation [1, Theorem A] of the restriction of to X 0 (here we use the reflexivity and continuity of on X 0 ).
Through a simultaneous induction in k, we shall prove that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
wherein < denotes the lexicographical ordering on R k . For the rest of the proof, it will be helpful to recall that
which is just a consequence of Lemma 4 (since satisfies the axiom of incommensurability of infinite values). Furthermore, because of recursion formula (3) (combined with the fact that < is the lexicographical ordering on R k ), one can summarize formulae (6) and (5) as follows:
in other words,
Let us now present the details of the inductive proof for assertions (5) and (4).
Base step for assertion (5) . Suppose that
The independence of means that
Thus, y ≺ z. Recalling that U 0 was chosen as Aumann's utility representation of on X 0 , it follows that U 0 (y) < U 0 (z). Base step for assertion (4). Consider two elements ξ = px 1 +(1−p)y and ξ = qx 1 + (1 − q)z of X 1 , wherein y, z ∈ X 0 , and suppose that ξ = ξ . Then p = q, because otherwise formula (6) would yield that either ξ ≺ ξ (in case p < q) or ξ ≺ ξ (in case q < p), both of which contradicts ξ = ξ since is reflexive. However, from p = q and px 1 + (1 − p)y = ξ = ξ = qx 1 + (1 − q)z, we may deduce that either p = q = 1 or y = z (or both). In either case, both (1 − p)U 0 (y) = (1 − q)U 0 (z) and p = q, and therefore finally U 1 (ξ) = U 1 (ξ ) by the recursive definition of U 1 in Equation (3) .
Simultaneous induction step for assertions (5) and (4). Suppose that assertions (5) and (4) hold for k − 1 instead of k.
• Proof of assertion (5) from the induction hypothesis. As in the base step for assertion (5) , the independence of yields that
On the other hand, the induction hypothesis implies assertion (5) for k − 1 instead of k and therefore also formula (7) for k − 1 instead of k. Combining this, we get
Note that p < 1, because otherwise the antecedens in the previous implication means x k ≺ x k , contradicting the reflexivity of . Therefore, we finally obtain
.
• Proof of assertion (4) from the induction hypothesis. The reasoning is analogous to the base step for assertion (4): Consider two elements ξ = px k + (1 − p)y and ξ = qx k + (1 − q)z of X k , wherein y, z ∈ X k−1 , and suppose that ξ = ξ . Then p = q, because otherwise formula (6) would yield that either ξ ≺ ξ (in case p < q) or ξ ≺ ξ (in case q < p), both of which contradicts ξ = ξ since is reflexive. However, from p = q and px k + (1 − p)y = ξ = ξ = qx k + (1 − q)z, we may deduce that either p = q = 1 or y = z (or both). In either case, both (1 − p)U k−1 (y) = (1 − q)U k−1 (z) and p = q, and therefore finally U k (ξ) = U k (ξ ) by the recursive definition of U k in Equation (3) . Hence, we have completed the inductive proof of assertions (5) and (4) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and as a consequence also obtain formula (7) for all k.
Finally, we shall prove, again by an inductive argument in k, that
holds for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider two elements ξ = px k + (1 − p)y and ξ = qx k + (1 − q)z of X k . Formula (6) implies that
hence by the independence axiom
However, y ∼ z implies U k−1 (y) = U k−1 (z) (by induction hypothesis in case k > 1, and by the choice of U 0 as Aumann's utility representation function in case k = 1), hence
Using the recursive definition of U k in Equation (3), this can be expressed as
Therefore, ξ ∼ ξ ⇒ U k (ξ) = U k (ξ ) for all ξ, ξ ∈ U k . This completes the proof of assertion (8) .
Combinining assertions (8) and (7) for k = n, we arrive at (9) ∀x, y ∈ X n (x ≺ y ⇒ U n (x) < U n (y), x ∼ y ⇒ U n (x) = U n (y)) .
Moreover, B n = B and hence X n = X. Also, a simple induction shows that U n : X → V is affine. Hence U n is a utility representation function for .
Proof of Theorem 2. Clearly, if there exists such a function as in Equation (1), then must have the properties listed in the Theorem.
The proof of the converse implication is identical to the proof of Theorem 1, except that the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem is used instead of Aumann's result [1] .
Proof of Corollary 3. Again it is clear that any relation with a utility representation as in formula (2) will have the properties listed in the Corollary.
The utility representation formula (2), however, follows from Theorem 2: For, there exists a canonical linear order-preserving embedding ι : V → * R of V into the hyperreals, defined through ι (e k ) := I k for all k ≤ n. Thus, if we define u := ι • U , then not only u (x k ) = ι (U (x k )) = ι (e k ) = I k for all k ≤ n, but also ∀x, y ∈ X x y ⇔ U (x) ≤ U (y) ⇔ ι (U (x)) ≤ ι (U (y)) ⇔ u(x) ≤ u(y).
